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TOWARD A CONSENSUS ON RELIGIOUS IMAGES IN CIVIC SEALS
UNDER THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: AMERICAN CIVIL
LIBERTIES UNION v. CITY OF STOW
I. INTRODUCTION
Issues concerning the relationship between religion and government
have aroused controversy since early in the history of our country.1 Our
nation's long-standing preoccupation with this subject is reflected by the
inclusion of the Establishment Clause in the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution. 2 Today, as we move forward into the twenty-
first century, our nation is becoming an increasingly complex tapestry of
religious and cultural diversity. 3 Through processes of immigration and
cultural change, the proportion of American citizens not subscribing to a
Judeo-Christian belief system is reaching unprecedented levels. 4 In this
context, disputes over government practices that seem to favor a particular
religion can be extremely disruptive for local communities, often inflam-
ing passions on both sides of the issue.5
1. See, e.g., ACLU v. City of Stow, 29 F. Supp. 2d 845, 847 (N.D. Ohio 1998)
(noting that Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses in First Amendment embody
fundamental and irreconcilable tension because our nation's founders were
deeply spiritual people, but they feared governmental interference with their relig-
ious practices);JOHN WITTE, JR., RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL Ex-
PERIMENT: ESSENTIAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 164 (2000) (noting that proper
application and relative priority of First Amendment religion clauses have been
subject to debate from founding period to present days).
2. See, e.g., Kyle D. Freeman, Note, Robinson v. City of Edmond: Establishment
Clause Jurisprudence and a Case for Governmental Acknowledgement of the Historical Role
of Religion, 32 TULSA L.J. 605, 615-18 (1997) (discussing debate concerning passage
of religious clauses in Bill of Rights). The Establishment Clause of the United
States Constitution provides that, "Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion .... " U.S. CONST. amend. I.
3. See Abington Township Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 240 (1963)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (noting that increased religious diversity has altered
composition of America's population since founding period); see also EQUAL
TREATMENT OF RELIGION IN A PLURALISTIC SOCIETY 4 (Steven V. Monsma &J. Chris-
topher Soper eds., 1998) [hereinafter EQUAL TREATMENT] (noting growth of relig-
ious pluralism in United States).
4. See EQUAL TREATMENT, supra note 3, at 4 (recognizing growth of Islamic,
Hindu, Buddhist and other non-Christian faiths in United States resulting from
immigration).
5. See, e.g., Stow, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 852 (noting that dispute over presence of
religious symbolism in government seal had divided local community); Kenneth L.
Karst, The First Amendment, the Politics of Religion and the Symbols of Government, 27
H~Av. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 503, 507-08 (1992) (noting capacity of issues involving gov-
ernment use of religious symbols to polarize citizens due to lack of middle ground
or room for compromise).
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Citizens who have been accustomed to the presence of what seemed
to be benign or neutral religious symbolism in the public sphere can be
highly resistant to changes, which they might view as being forced upon
them by supposed outsiders. 6 At the same time, persons from other back-
grounds may find such symbolism oppressive or even inflammatory, caus-
ing them to feel like outsiders in the political life of the cities and towns
they inhabit.7 Meanwhile, modern shifts in the religious composition of
the United States are bringing issues concerning the entanglement of re-
ligion and government back to the forefront of the national conscious-
ness, infused with a new degree of complexity.8 As this trend continues,
the courts will assuredly be called upon to re-examine the religious over-
tones of political life in our increasingly diverse society. 9 In American Civil
Liberties Union v. City of Stow, 10 the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio was called upon to engage in such an examina-
tion in order to resolve a dispute over the presence of a Christian cross in
a city's official governmental seal."I In striking down the disputed city
seal, the Stow court provided a coherent analytical framework, within
which the diverse case law on this issue can be harmonized into one per-
suasive guiding principle. 12
This Note discusses the Stow decision, and its relevance within the
general context of First Amendment Establishment Clause jurisprudence
dealing with challenges to religious imagery in government seals and em-
blems. Part II provides an overview of the case law relevant to this topic. 13
6. See Peter K. Rofes, The First Amendment in Its Third Century: Three Wisconsin
Pieces to the Constitutional Puzzle, 1998 Wis. L. REv. 861, 878 (1998) (describing pub-
lic outrage over legal challenge by supposed "outsider" to cross in City of Wauwa-
tosa, Wisconsin's official seal).
7. See Friedman v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Bernalillo, 781 F.2d 777, 781
(10th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (noting that for Jews, crosses had sometimes repre-
sented oppression and persecution, and that today they might convey same mes-
sage for Moslems from Lebanon or Protestants from Northern Ireland).
8. See, e.g., EQUAL TREATMENT, supra note 3, at 3 (noting "increasing religious
pluralism" as reason to consider approaches to Establishment Clause interpreta-
tion); see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1296 (2d ed.
1988) (noting impact of growing religious diversity on law).
9. See WrIrTE, supra note 1, at 173 (noting that lower courts have decided
broad range of Establishment Clause questions, while United States Supreme
Court rulings have dealt mainly with disputes over religion and education); see also
ALBERTJ. MENENDEZ, THE DECEMBER WARS 161 (1993) (noting that forces pervad-
ing court system will impact on religious life of Americans in coming years,
through resolution of current constitutional questions).
10. 29 F. Supp. 2d 845 (N.D. Ohio 1998).
11. See id. at 847 (noting that basis of suit was dispute over whether municipal
seal with religious imagery violated Establishment Clause).
12. For a discussion of the Stow court's analysis, the guiding principle at which
it arrived and the relevance of its decision for future disputes, see infra notes 87-
180 and accompanying text.
13. For a discussion of relevant Establishment Clause case law and of cases
dealing specifically with religious symbols in government seals, see infra notes 17-
75 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 46: p. 585
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Part III sets forth the factual background of the Stow case.1 4 Part IV re-
views the reasoning of the Stow court and examines the strengths and
weaknesses of the analytical framework put forward by that court in its
attempt to harmonize the existing case law on this issue and arrive at a
principled standard of decision. 15 Finally, Part V discusses the implica-
tions of this decision in the context of general trends in Establishment
Clause jurisprudence on the issue of religious symbols in government
seals. 1
6
II. BACKGROUND
A. Early Establishment Clause Jurisprudence
In 1947, the United States Supreme Court decided Everson v. Board of
Education.17 In that case, more than 150 years after the First Amendment
was ratified, the Court made its first close examination and interpretation
of the Establishment Clause. 18 The issue to be decided in Everson was
whether a local school board, acting under a New Jersey statute, could
validly reimburse parents for the cost of their children's bus transporta-
tion to Catholic parochial schools. 19 The Court held that this practice of
reimbursing parents did not violate the Establishment Clause. 20 Interest-
ingly, both the majority and dissenting opinions made reference to the
14. For a discussion of the facts of the Stow case, see infra notes 76-86 and
accompanying text.
15. For a discussion of the district court's reasoning in Stow, see infra notes 87-
161 and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of the implications of the Stow ruling for the future of
Establishment Clause jurisprudence on the issue of religious symbols in govern-
ment seals, see infra notes 162-184 and accompanying text.
17. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
18. See ROBERT T. MILLER & RONALD B. FLOWERS, TOwARD BENEVOLENT NEU-
TRALITY- CHURCH, STATE, AND THE SUPREME COURT 9 (5th ed. 1996) (noting that
until 1947, United States Supreme Court did not expressly base any ruling on Es-
tablishment Clause grounds). Some earlier cases could have raised Establishment
Clause issues, but the Court relied on other bases to support its holdings. See id.
(discussing early Supreme Court cases involving possible Establishment Clause
questions, but decided on other grounds).
19. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 3 (discussing government practice challenged in
Everson lawsuit). The Everson Court engaged in a detailed review of the historical
context in which the Establishment Clause was drafted and adopted in order to
guide its interpretation. See id. at 8-14 (discussing historical setting in which First
Amendment was drafted). Historical evidence has often been invoked to aid in
interpretation of the Framers' intent in drafting the Establishment Clause, some-
times in support of conflicting positions. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAw: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 971 (1997) (noting that abstractness of Framers'
language and divergences among their views allows historical evidence to support
any view).
20. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 18 (noting Supreme Court's holding). In uphold-
ing the challenged program, the Court analogized it to government practices such
as the provision of ordinary police and fire protection for religious organizations,
the denial of which would arguably evince an unnecessary hostility towards relig-
ion. See id. at 17-18 (noting that First Amendment was never intended to cut off
2001] NOTE 587
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Establishment Clause in terms of a "wall" separating Church and State. 2 1
That language has generally been read as articulating a strict separationist
viewpoint. 22 Everson remains a significant case for that foundational analy-
sis and also because it was the first time the Court specifically applied the
Establishment Clause to the states.2 3
religious institutions from basic government services that are only incidentally re-
lated to religious functions).
21. Compare id. (stating that "a wall between church and state" had been er-
ected by First Amendment, and that Supreme Court could not allow transgression
of that wall by any government practice, but finding that challenged New Jersey
law caused no such impermissible breach), with id. at 29 (Rutledge, J., dissenting)
(noting that First Amendment did in fact create wall between affairs of church and
state, but arguing that majority's ruling had improperly weakened it), and id. at 28
(Jackson,J., dissenting) (noting general agreement with Rutledge's dissent, includ-
ing his summary of historical efforts to maintain separation between matters of
religion and government). The concept of a "wall of separation" as a metaphorical
representation of the First Amendment's religious protections, originated with a
letter written by President Jefferson in 1802 to the Danbury Baptist Association of
Connecticut. See generally Daniel L. Dreisbach & John D. Whaley, What the Wall
Separates: A Debate on Thomas Jefferson's "Wall of Separation" Metaphor, 16 CONST. COM-
MENT. 627 (1999) (discussing history, context and meaning of Jefferson's "wall of
separation" metaphor).
22. See, e.g., MILLER & FLOWERS, supra note 18, at 10 (noting that Everson rul-
ing put forward strict separationist interpretation of Establishment Clause). The
strict separationist viewpoint holds that religion and government ought to be kept
apart as much as possible. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 19, at 977-83 (describing
"strict separation," and competing viewpoints of "neutrality theory" and "accom-
modation"). The "neutrality" approach to the Establishment clause maintains that
government may not show favoritism amongst religions, nor show any partiality as
between religion and secularism. See id. at 978 (describing neutrality theory and its
reading of Establishment Clause). The "accommodation" approach holds that the
Constitution prohibits the literal establishment of a national religion, but does not
bar governmental acknowledgment of the importance of religion in society. See id.
at 981 (describing accommodation approach to Establishment Clause interpreta-
tion). Of course, these three major theories are not exhaustive of the possible
approaches to Establishment Clause interpretation, and there may be variations
within the basic theme of each. See id. at 977 n.1 (noting diversity of approaches to
First Amendment Religion Clauses).
23. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 7-8 (noting that if disputed NewJersey law were to
be struck down, it would be as violation of Establishment Clause); see also MILLER &
FLOWERS, supra note 18, at 9 (noting that Everson first applied Establishment Clause
to states through incorporation into Fourteenth Amendment). The Everson Court
gave no analysis to support its application of the Establishment Clause to the states,
and it remains somewhat unclear whether any proper basis can be found for that
decision in the First and Fourteenth Amendments. See TRIBE, supra note 8, at 1156
& n.5 (discussing syntactic and history-based objections to Establishment Clause
incorporation). Some commentators have criticized this aspect of Everson, but the
issue has been primarily confined to academic debate. See, e.g., William P. Gray,
Jr., The Ten Commandments and the Ten Amendments: A Case Study in Religious Freedom
in Alabama, 49 ALA. L. REV. 509, 510 (1998) (arguing against incorporation of First
Amendment); William K. Lietzau, Rediscovering the Establishment Clause: Federalism
and the Rollback ofIncorporation, 39 DEPAUL L. REv. 1191, 1193-94 (1990) (criticizing
application of Establishment Clause to states and arguing for partial rollback of
incorporation). As such, any wholesale change of position by the Supreme Court
on this aspect of incorporation doctrine seems highly unlikely. See Robert R.
[Vol. 46: p. 585
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In the years following Everson, no clear guidelines existed for Estab-
lishment Clause decisions. 24 The Supreme Court's opinions wavered be-
tween adherence to Everson's separationist rhetoric and application of a
more accommodationist approach. 2 5 It was not until 1971, when the
United States Supreme Court decided Lemon v. Kurtzman,26 that an inte-
grated test for Establishment Clause questions finally emerged.27
B. The Endorsement Formulation of the Lemon Test
In Lemon, the Court faced challenges to a Rhode Island statute that
provided for supplements to the salaries of private school teachers and a
Pennsylvania statute that provided financial reimbursements to nonpublic
schools for books, materials and teacher salaries. 28 Both laws were ulti-
mately struck down as unconstitutional. 29 In reaching that decision, the
Court put forward a three-part test that would come to be known as the
Lemon test.30 The Court stated succinctly: "First, the statute must have a
secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be
one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must
not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion." 3 1 The
three prongs of this test are applied independently, such that a law or
government practice failing to satisfy any one of them will be judged
unconstitutional.3
2
Baugh, Applying the Bill of Rights to the States: A Response to William P. Gray, Jr., 49 ALA.
L. REv. 551, 553 (1998) (noting lack of evidence suggesting uncertainty on part of
any current Supreme Court Justice as to propriety of Establishment Clause
incorporation).
24. See MILLER & FLOWERS, supra note 18, at 10-11 (noting lack of clear gui-
dance from Establishment Clause decisions after Everson).
25. See id. at 11 (noting lack of "clear line of interpretation" in cases decided
between Everson and Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962)). For a discussion of sepa-
rationist and accommodationist viewpoints, see supra note 22 and accompanying
text.
26. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
27. See MILLER & FLOWERS, supra note 18, at 11 (noting that three elements,
commonly referred to as Lemon test, were first used together in that case).
28. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 606-07 (noting bases of lawsuit).
29. See id. at 607 (holding two challenged state statutes unconstitutional).
30. See id. at 612-13 (stating three-part test to be applied for Establishment
Clause questions).
31. Id. at 612-13 (citations omitted) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S.
664, 674 (1970)). The secular purpose and primary effect prongs of the Lemon test
were first applied in Abington Township School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203
(1963), while the excessive entanglement prong was originally put forward in Walz
v. Tax Commissioner, 397 U.S. 664 (1970). See MILLER & FLOWERS, supra note 18, at
11 (noting origins of Lemon test's individual elements).
32. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 19, at 986 (noting that each element of Lemon
must be satisfied independently).
20011 NOTE
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The continuing applicability of Lemon has been in question for many
years. 33 The test has been heavily criticized for producing inconsistent
and unpredictable results. 34 Members of the United States Supreme
Court have also called Lemon into doubt.35 In Lee v. Weisman,36 Justice
Scalia even went so far as to call for the outright rejection of the test.37
Furthermore, in Marsh v. Chambers,38 the Court ruled on an Establishment
Clause question without applying the Lemon test at all. 39 In Marsh, the
Nebraska Legislature's practice of beginning each session with a prayer by
a paid Presbyterian minister was found to be constitutionally permissible
based on the "unique history" of the practice, without reference to the
three prongs of Lemon.
4 0
More recently, in a dissent to the United States Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe,41 Chief Justice Rehnquist
took note of Lemon's "checkered career," reciting an extensive laundry list
of Court opinions that have either criticized the test, suggested that it is
not binding or decided Establishment Clause questions without reference
to it.4 2 The majority in Santa Fe, however, made explicit reference to
Lemon's secular purpose prong in striking down a school district's chal-
33. See, e.g., id. at 987 (noting current and future uncertainty as to status of
Lemon test); Karst, supra note 5, at 503 (predicting, in 1992, that Lemon test would
soon be replaced by more permissive standard of decision).
34. See generally Thomas C. Marks, Jr. & Michael Bertolini, Lemon Is a Lemon:
Toward a Rational Interpretation of the Establishment Clause, 12 BYUJ. PUB. L. 1 (1997)
(criticizing Lemon and proposing alternative tests); see also Freeman, supra note 2,
at 621 (criticizing lack of coherence in Supreme Court cases following Lemon).
35. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 19, at 987 (noting that Supreme Court Jus-
tices having expressed dissatisfaction with Lemon, or having supported alternative
tests, constitute majority of current Court).
36. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
37. See id., 505 U.S. at 644 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that majority opin-
ion ignored Lemon, supposedly demonstrating irrelevance of that test). In one
memorable concurrence, Justice Scalia opined that "[l]ike some ghoul in a late-
night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after
being repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause jurispru-
dence once again, frightening the little children and school attorneys .... "
Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993)
(concurring in judgment but criticizing majority's invocation of Lemon).
38. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
39. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 19, at 1004 (noting that Supreme Court did
not apply Lemon in Marsh decision, affirming constitutionality of state employment
of minister for legislative prayers).
40. See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 791 (finding that legislative prayer poses no threat
to Establishment Clause given history of practice). The majority in Marsh made
only one reference to Lemon, and that was simply to mention that the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit had applied that test in striking down the
government practice at issue. See id. at 786 (noting basis for circuit court ruling).
For further discussion of the circumstances and relevance of the Marsh case, see
infra notes 153-57 and accompanying text.
41. 120 S. Ct. 2266 (2000).
42. See id. at 2284 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (collecting opinions that criti-
cize Lemon, treat it as non-binding, or fail to apply it).
[Vol. 46: p. 585
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lenged policy, finding that its clear improper purpose was to encourage
the delivery of a prayer at school events. 4 3 Still, the Court did not rely
exclusively on Lemon for its holding, basing its ruling on other grounds as
well.
4 4
It would seem, then, that Lemon has managed to survive into the
twenty-first century, if only as one of several general approaches. 45 At the
very least, the test has not yet been overruled. 4 6 Notably, the Lemon test
has been, and continues to be, applied consistently by lower federal courts
in cases dealing with religious symbols in government seals.4 7 Most of
these cases have placed particular emphasis on a formulation of Lemon's
first and second prongs, which asks whether a disputed government prac-
tice has the purpose or effect of endorsing religion.
48
The origins of this endorsement test can be found in the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Lynch v. Donnelly,49 in a concurring
43. See id. at 2281-83 (finding policy unconstitutional on its face for lack of
secular purpose, and on other grounds). Chief Justice Rehnquist acknowledged
the Santa Fe Independent School District majority's use of the Lemon test, but claimed
that the test was applied too stringently, as opposed to using its factors as mere
guideposts for analysis. See id. at 2284 & n.1 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting) (criticiz-
ing majority's strict application of Lemon test).
44. See id. at 2283 (invalidating policy on ground that it established "improper
majoritarian election on religion," in addition to improper purpose grounds).
The Court also pointed out that the question of whether, from the perspective of
an objective observer, the challenged state practice would be perceived as an en-
dorsement of religion, is pertinent for Establishment Clause inquiries. See id. at
2278 (noting relevance of endorsement test in deciding Establishment Clause
questions). See also Marcia Coyle, Justices Struggle with a Lemon': Landmark Church-
State Ruling Needs Updating-But How?, NAT'L L.J., July 3, 2000, at Al (noting that
Santa Fe Independent School District Court relied on parts of Lemon test, along with
parts of alternative approaches that had arisen out of discontentment with Lemon).
45. See generally Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 120 S. Ct. at 2266 (applying elements
of Lemon test, along with other approaches, to strike down challenged school dis-
trict policy).
46. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 19, at 987 (noting that Supreme Court has
never explicitly overruled Lemon decision, nor rejected its test).
47. See Robinson v. City of Edmond, 68 F.3d 1226, 1229 (10th Cir. 1995) (ap-
plying Lemon test to determine constitutionality of religious symbol in government
seal); Murray v. City of Austin, 947 F.2d 147, 154 (5th Cir. 1991) (same); Harris v.
City of Zion, 927 F.2d 1401, 1411-15 (7th Cir. 1991) (determining constitutionality
of two different government seals under Lemon test); Friedman v. Bd. of County
Comm'rs of Bernalillo, 781 F.2d 777, 780 (10th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (applying
Lemon test in city seal dispute); Webb v. City of Republic, 55 F. Supp. 2d 994, 997
(W.D. Mo. 1999) (same); ACLU v. City of Stow, 29 F. Supp. 2d 845, 84748 (N.D.
Ohio 1998) (same); see also Foremaster v. City of St. George, 882 F.2d 1485, 1491
(10th Cir. 1989) (noting lower court's application of Lemon, but remanding case to
resolve remaining issue of material fact as to second prong effects test).
48. For a discussion of cases applying an endorsement formulation of the
Lemon test's first and or second prongs in the context of Establishment Clause
challenges to religious symbols in government seals, see infra note 128 and accom-
panying text.
49. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
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opinion by Justice O'Connor.5 0 Under this formulation, the presence or
absence of a message suggesting endorsement of religion in a government
practice is generally assessed from the perspective of a reasonable, in-
formed observer.5 ' Since its inception, this incarnation of the Lemon test
has been invoked, and sometimes criticized, in Supreme Court opinions
with varying degrees of consistency. 52
C. Establishment Clause Challenges to Religious Symbols in Government Seals
Several federal courts have considered the constitutional propriety of
government seals that contained religious symbols.5 3 The first case to deal
with a challenge to such a seal was Friedman v. Board of County Commissioners
of Bernalillo,54 which arose in the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit. 55 In Friedman, the Tenth Circuit faced a challenge to the
county seal of Bernalillo, New Mexico, which included a cross.56 The seal
also included a Spanish inscription meaning "With This We Conquer"
which was placed below the cross.57 The Friedman court relied on the sec-
50. See id. at 691-92 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (putting forward endorse-
ment formulation for first and second prongs of Lemon test); see also, MILLER &
FLOWERS, supra note 18, at 12 (noting that Justice O'Connor had put forward new
formulation of Lemon test, which focused on whether government practices were
indicative of endorsement or disapproval of religion, to decide whether impermis-
sible purposes or effects were present) (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668
(1984)). The endorsement test is one of several modifications and replacements
that Supreme Courtjustices have from time to time implemented as correctives for
the weaknesses of the Lemon test. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 2, at 623-26 (dis-
cussing endorsement test, psychological coercion test and legal coercion test, put
forward by various Justices to compensate for failings of Lemon).
51. See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 772-73
(1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasizing that endorsement test is applied
from perspective of reasonable, informed observer).
52. See MILLER & FLOWERS, supra note 18, at 13 (noting that three Supreme
Court decisions between 1987 and 1991 used Justice O'Connor's formulation, out
of nine Establishment Clause cases that were heard). But see id. at 16 (stating that
Justice Scalia, speaking for plurality in Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board v.
Pinette, denied any status to endorsement test). Notably, the Supreme Court made
repeated references to the concept of endorsement in a recent decision involving
prayer in public schools. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 120 S. Ct. 2266,
2282 (2000) (noting that enactment of school policy was unconstitutional, based
on impermissible purpose and perception of endorsement for student prayer).
53. For a discussion of cases dealing with religious symbols in government
seals, see infra notes 54-75 and accompanying text.
54. 781 F.2d 777 (10th Cir. 1985) (en banc).
55. SeeACLU v. City of Stow, 29 F. Supp. 2d 845, 849 (N.D. Ohio 1998) (not-
ing that this type of question was first considered in Tenth Circuit).
56. See Friedman v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Bernalillo, 781 F.2d 770, 778
(10th Cir. 1985) (noting basis of lawsuit). The challenged cross in Friedman was
quite prominent within the Bernalillo seal, standing nearly a foot high on the
county vehicles that featured it. See id. at 779 n.1 (noting relative size of cross
within county seal).
57. See id. at 779 (describing contents of Bernalillo seal). One commentator
has suggested that the motto, "Con Esta Vencemos" or "With This We Conquer,"
can be traced to the Emperor Constantine the First, who, before an important
592
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ond prong of the Lemon test to find the Bernalillo seal unconstitutional. 58
In doing so, the court focused on Justice O'Connor's endorsement formu-
lation of Lemon's second prong effects test.59
In 1991, the Seventh and Fifth Circuits each weighed in on this is-
sue.6° In Harris v. City of Zion,61 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit found that the city seals of Rolling Meadows, and Zion,
Illinois, each of which included a cross, were unconstitutional. 62 Like the
Tenth Circuit in Friedman, the Harris court relied on the endorsement for-
mulation of the Lemon test, ruling that both seals represented an imper-
missible endorsement of Christianity. 63 In contrast, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in Murray v. City of Austin,64 ruled
that the City of Austin's official insignia, which included a cross, did not
battle, "purportedly saw a blazing cross in the sky and said, 'In this sign I shall
conquer."' See Karst, supra note 5,. at 521 n.66 (discussing possible origin of phrase
in seal). Notably, after winning that battle, Constantine "consolidated the Chris-
tian church into a single establishment and converted to Christianity." See id. (not-
ing connection between Christianity and origins of motto in seal). The Friedman
court, however, heard conflicting testimony on the meaning of the motto and
found that the evidence was unclear. See Friedman, 781 F.2d at 779 (discussing
evidence regarding meaning of motto in Bernalillo seal).
58. See Friedman, 781 F.2d at 780-81 (reversing lower court's finding that chal-
lenged seal could satisfy Lemon's second prong effects test).
59. See id. at 781 (stating that Lemon's effects prong asks whether disputed
government practice "conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval," regard-
less of its purpose (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O'Connor,
J., concurring))). The Friedman court took notice of the pervasive use of the seal
in Bernalillo County, making clear that this factor differentiated the present case
from holiday display disputes. See id. at 782 (noting use of seal on vehicles,
paperwork and sheriffs uniforms).
60. See Stow, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 849-50 (reviewing circuit court rulings on chal-
lenges to government seals with religious images).
61. 927 F.2d 1401 (7th Cir. 1991).
62. See id. at 1415 (striking down two challenged seals as unconstitutional).
The City seal of Zion consisted of a shield, which included, in addition to the cross,
a dove holding a branch, a crown with a sword and the name "Zion." See id. at
1403-04 (describing contents of Zion seal). The court also found that the City of
Zion's logo and emblem, which included elements similar to the city seal, were
unconstitutional. See id. at 1404, 1415 (noting design of logo and emblem, and
finding them unconstitutional). The Rolling Meadows seal included a leaf, a water
tower with two industrial buildings and a church, in addition to the contested
cross. See id. at 1403 (describing design of Rolling Meadows' seal).
63. See id. at 1415 (holding that contested seals were unconstitutional, as en-
dorsements of particular religious beliefs). The Harris court agreed with the trial
court's analysis that the Zion seal might also violate the "purpose" prong of the
Lemon test, See id. at 1413 (noting improper purpose of seal as possible alternative
basis for ruling). The court also noted that the Rolling Meadows seal was viewed
throughout the year, differentiating it from annual holiday displays with religious
elements. See id. at 1412 (noting that year-round use of government seal furnished
stronger case for finding of unconstitutionality than suits challenging short term
seasonal displays ).
64. 947 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1991).
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violate the Establishment Clause.65 The court stated that the insignia
"passes constitutional muster" under the Lemon test, and also under any
standard that might be derived from other rulings by the Supreme
Court.66 Among the Supreme Court cases specifically listed in that con-
text was County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh
Chapter,67 in which a majority of the Court apparently relied on the en-
dorsement formulation of the Lemon test.68 Still, the Austin court declined
to lay down a constitutional "bright line test" for the use of religious sym-
bols in government seals, instead expressly deciding the case on "the total-
ity of its unique facts and circumstances." 69
It seemed that the United States Supreme Court might be ready to
rule on the issue of religious symbols in government seals in 1996, when
the Court fell one vote short of granting certiorari for Robinson v. City of
Edmond.7t 1 The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit had
revisited the issue of religious symbols in government seals in Robinson,
again holding that a seal containing a cross violated the Establishment
65. See id. at 158 (finding no constitutional violation for presence of cross in
disputed insignia). The official "seal" of Austin is a star, however, the parties to
this case used the terms "seal" and "insignia" interchangeably. See id. at 150 n.3
(noting that parties treated terms as equivalent). In any event, the Murray court
never differentiated the Austin insignia from the city seals dealt with in other cases
on the basis of that nomenclature. See generally Murray, 947 F.2d 147 (treating in-
signia as equivalent concept in discussion of city seal cases). Furthermore, the Stow
decision only used the term "seal" in discussing the Murray case. See, e.g., Stow, 29
F. Supp. 2d at 850 (using "seal" terminology, rather than "insignia," in discussion
of Murray decision). For the purposes of this Note, the terms will be treated as
synonymous.
66. See Murray, 947 F.2d at 158 (noting that Austin insignia need not be held
unconstitutional under various Supreme Court decisions). The court mentioned a
number of then-recent Supreme Court rulings in addition to Lemon, and stated
that they would not compel a finding of unconstitutionality for the Austin insignia.
See id. (citing County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989), Lynch v. Donnelly,
465 U.S. 668 (1984), and Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983)).
67. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
68. See Stow, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 848 (noting that Justice O'Connor's endorse-
ment test had received some support from otherJustices and that Supreme Court
majority had apparently relied on it in deciding Allegheny). The Murray court re-
peatedly made reference to the concept of endorsement in its Establishment
Clause analysis. See, e.g., Murray, 947 F.2d at 156, 158 (making reference to en-
dorsement test in determining that Austin City insignia was not unconstitutional).
69. See Murray, 947 F.2d at 158 (giving basis for holding). The Murray court
apparently placed significant weight on the fact that Austin's insignia, and the
cross therein, were derived from the family crest of Stephen F. Austin. See id. at
149 (noting that insignia was based on family crest of City's namesake, and "Father
of Texas," Stephen F. Austin). Stephen F. Austin has been a revered figure in the
history of Texas and is widely credited with having played a pivotal role in the
events which led to the Texas Revolution and the creation of the Lone Star Repub-
lic. See GREGG CANTRELL, STEPHEN F. AUSTIN: EMPRESARIO OF TEXAS 2 (1999) (dis-
cussing historical role of Stephen F. Austin).
70. 68 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied 517 U.S. 1201 (1996).
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Clause.7 1 ChiefJustice Rehnquist's dissent to the Supreme Court's denial
of certiorari identified a possible circuit split on the question of whether a
city seal containing a religious symbol, specifically a cross, violates the First
Amendment.72 Nonetheless, in the absence of a decision from the Su-
preme Court to provide guidance on this specific issue, the lower federal
courts have been left to seek a principled basis for decisions from the avail-
able case law. 73 In American Civil Liberties Union v. City of Stow,7 the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio arrived at a "guid-
ing principle" for such decisions, prohibiting the pervasive governmental
usage of blatantly sectarian religious symbols.
75
III. FACTS IN AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION V. CITY OF STOW
In Stow, the American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio, Inc. (ACLU),
and the City of Stow, Ohio, each brought suits to decide whether the in-
clusion of a Christian cross in the City of Stow's official seal violated the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 76 Both parties filed mo-
71. See id. at 1233 (holding city seal with cross unconstitutional). The seal
challenged in Robinson consisted of four quadrants, which contained a cross, in
addition to a tower, a covered wagon and a steam engine with an oil derrick. See id.
at 1228 (describing contents of challenged seal). The court found that the dis-
puted seal, like the seal in the Friedman case, conveyed an unconstitutional mes-
sage of endorsement for Christianity. See id. at 1233 (finding that observers would
perceive impermissible message from seal). The Tenth Circuit also dealt with a
challenge to a government seal with alleged religious content in Foremaster v. City of
Saint George, 882 F.2d 1485 (10th Cir. 1989). See id. at 1231 (noting that Foremaster
case involved challenge to city seal depicting local Mormon temple). Reversing a
grant of summary judgment by the United States District Court for the District of
Utah in favor of the City of Saint George, the Foremaster court held that an issue of
material fact remained as to whether the seal conveyed a message of endorsement.
See Foremaster, 882 F.2d at 1492 (remanding case for trial on issue of seal's effect).
72. See City of Edmond v. Robinson, 517 U.S. 1201 (1996) (6-3 decision)
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (noting possible circuit split as reason to grant certio-
rari). ChiefJustice Rehnquist's dissent, which was joined by Justice Scalia and Jus-
tice Thomas, also suggested that resolution might be required for a possible circuit
split over the standing requirements for plaintiffs challenging symbols in govern-
ment seals. See id. at 1201-02 (noting unresolved standing issue). Generally, the
standing requirements for citizens pressing claims under the Establishment Clause
have been much more permissive than ordinary standing rules. See WriTrE, supra
note 1, at 150-51 (discussing unique "relaxed" standing rules that have been devel-
oped for Establishment Clause questions).
73. See Maryland v. Bait. Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912, 919 (1950) (noting
that no indication as to Supreme Court's views can be taken from denial of
certiorari).
74. 29 F. Supp. 2d 845 (N.D. Ohio 1998).
75. See id. at 850 ("The guiding principle running through the cases appears
to be that, if done carefully, a governmental body may use a religious, but not a
sectarian, concept or symbol on a daily basis.").
76. See id. at 847 (discussing who parties to lawsuit were). The ACLU filed suit
on behalf of its clients, described asJohn and Jane Does one, two and three. See id.
(noting that ACLU represented three anonymous parties). The individual lawsuits
by the ACLU and the City of Stow were consolidated in this one action. See id.
(noting consolidation of actions for trial).
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tions for summary judgment on the sole issue of whether the design of the
seal was constitutionally permissible.
77
The challenged seal appeared on Stow's City Hall, as well as on the
City's government vehicles, flag, stationary and tax forms. 78 The seal was
divided into four quadrants of equivalent size.79 Each of the quadrants
included symbolic images representing life in Stow, three of which were
non-religious in nature.8 0 The upper left quadrant, however, included a
large cross resting on an open book.8 1 The City's pleadings described the
cross as "stylized" and noted that it did not contain nails.8 2 The ACLU
asked the court to find that the inclusion of the cross and open book
within the seal represented an unconstitutional endorsement of religion,
as a matter of law.8 The City contended that "taken as a whole, the seal
[did] not endorse any particular religion, or even religion in general," but
77. See id. (noting cross motions for summary judgment by parties to lawsuit).
The parties also disputed whether the seal violated Article I, Section 7 of the Ohio
Constitution, but the court found it unnecessary to resolve that issue. See id. at 847,
853 (noting alternative basis for challenge to seal, under Ohio State Constitution).
Article I, Section 7 of Ohio's State Constitution provides, in relevant part, that "no
preference shall be given, by law, to any religious society; nor shall any interfer-
ence with the rights of conscience be permitted." OHIO CONST. art. I, § 7. There
has been no indication from the courts of Ohio that they would give any stricter
construction to these terms than the Supreme Court has given to the comparable
provisions of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. See S. Ridge
Baptist Church v. Indus. Comm'n, 676 F. Supp. 799, 808 (S.D. Ohio 1987) (noting
that Ohio courts have not read provisions of State Constituion to extend protec-
tions beyond those of Religion Clauses in First Amendment to United States
Constitution).
78. See Stow, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 847 (noting widespread use of seal in Stow).
The City of Stow is located in Ohio, with an estimated 1992 population in excess of
28,000 persons, living in an area covering approximately seventeen square miles.
See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, COUNTY AND CITY DATA BOOK 806 (12th ed. 1994)
(providing statistical information about Stow).
79. See Stow, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 847 (describing composition of seal). The offi-
cial seal was designed by a local resident and adopted after a citywide competition
in 1966. See id. (discussing origins of disputed city seal).
80. See id. (noting contents of seal). The non-religious images in the Stow
City seal included representations of a factory, a home, and a scroll with a quill and
ink bottle. See id. (describing non-religious images appearing in other quadrants
of seal).
81. See id. (describing religious imagery in seal); see also id. at 854 (providing
photocopy image of disputed seal).
82. See id. at 851 (noting description of seal in City's pleadings).
83. See id. at 847 (setting forth basis of ACLU motion for summaryjudgment).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides that summary judgment "shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genu-
ine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to ajudgment
as a matter of law." See FED. R. Crv. P. 56(c) (providing federal standard for sum-
mary judgment).
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rather, that the cross and book symbols simply acknowledged the general
spiritual or philosophical concerns held by people in any community.
8 4
The court concluded that a reasonably informed and objective ob-
server would infer from the prominent depiction of a Christian cross in
Stow's seal that adherence to Christianity was relevant to a citizen's politi-
cal standing in the city.8 5 Based on this finding, the court granted sum-
mary judgment to the ACLU, holding that the seal violated the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution.
8 6
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Narrative Analysis
The Stow court began its analysis by noting that application of "strict
scrutiny" is appropriate when assessing the constitutionality of a govern-
ment action "suggestive of a 'denominational preference.' ' 8 7 The district
court then restated the elements of Lemon's test for Establishment Clause
violations. 88 The court also stated the rule that government practices chal-
lenged under the Establishment Clause must withstand scrutiny under
each of Lemon's three prongs independently. 89 The court acknowledged
that the Supreme Court has not treated the Lemon test as "the 'be-all' and
'end-all' in Establishment Clause cases," but asserted that the Court had
applied it "almost exclusively."90 Reference was also made to the regular-
84. See Stow, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 847 (noting arguments by City of Stow in sup-
port of motion for summary judgment).
85. See id. at 853 (setting forth district court's findings).
86. See id. (noting court's resolution of dispute in favor of ACLU, on motions
for summary judgment).
87. See id. at 847 (quoting County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chap-
ter, 492 U.S. 573, 608-09 (1989)). In Allegheny, the United States Supreme Court
faced an Establishment Clause challenge to two holiday displays on public prop-
erty, which contained symbolism that was arguably religious in nature. See Alle-
gheny, 492 U.S. at 578. In the Allegheny opinion, Justice Blackmun spoke for a
majority of the Court in stating that special vigilance would be required for govern-
ment practices suggesting favoritism of particular religious groups. See id. at 608-09
(noting application of strict scrutiny where government practice was suggestive of
denominational favoritism); see also id. at 578 (noting thatJustice Blackmun spoke
for Court in portion of Allegheny opinion requiring application of strict scrutiny,
though some other parts of opinion were not joined by majority).
88. See Stow, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 847 (noting application of Lemon test for Estab-
lishment Clause questions). The Stow court restated the Lemon test as follows:
"First, the governmental action in question must have a secular purpose. Second,
its principal or primary effect must be one that 'neither advances nor inhibits'
religion. And, third, the action must not foster an excessive government entangle-
ment with religion." Id. at 848.
89. See id. at 847-48 (citing Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583 (1987) (not-
ing that three elements of Lemon test must be met independently)).
90. See id. at 848 (noting continued application of Lemon test).
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ity with which the, circuit courts had continued to rely on Lemon.9 1 The
Stow court then took note of the Supreme Court's use of the "endorse-
ment" formulation of the Lemon test, as stated by Justice O'Connor's con-
curring opinion in Lynch.9
2
1. District Court's Analysis of Guiding Case Law
The district court made it clear that the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit had never ruled on a challenge to a cross in a
municipal seal. 93 The court then set out a straightforward synopsis of the
three decisions in which other circuit courts had ruled on this issue as a
matter of first impression. 9 4 Notably, this review of case law made no men-
tion of Robinson v. City of Edmond,95 as that case was not a decision of first
impression for the Tenth Circuit.96
Reviewing the decisions of the Tenth Circuit in Friedman and the Sev-
enth Circuit in Zion, the Stow court noted that those rulings had both
found city seals containing crosses to be impermissible under the Estab-
lishment Clause. 97 The district court stated that those two decisions had
expressly relied on the finding that the seals in question had each con-
veyed the message that Christianity was being endorsed.98 The court's
opinion also took note of the references made by the Friedman and Zion
courts to the pervasive usage of the seals that they struck down. 99
The Stow court next reviewed the Murray case, contrasting the Fifth
Circuit's holding that the cross in the City of Austin's insignia did not
91. See id. (noting regular use of Lemon test by circuit courts). The district
court gave particular attention to the continuing application of Lemon by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. See id. (citing Chaudhuri v.
Tennessee, 130 F.3d 232, 236 (6th Cir. 1997) (applying Lemon test); Dayton Area Visu-
ally Impaired Persons, Inc. v. Fisher, 70 F.3d 1474, 1482 (6th Cir. 1995) (same); Ams.
United for Separation of Church & State v. City of Grand Rapids, 980 F.2d 1538, 1543
(6th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (same)).
92. See id. at 848-49 (discussing endorsement test spelled out by Justice
O'Connor in her concurring opinion for Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-94
(1984)).
93. See id. at 849 (noting that Establishment Clause challenge to cross in gov-
ernment seal was matter of first impression for Sixth Circuit).
94. See id. at 849-50 (discussing circuit court rulings in Friedman v. Bd. of
County Comm'rs of Bernalillo, 781 F.2d 777 (10th Cir. 1985) (en banc), Harris v. City
of Zion, 927 F.2d 1401 (7th Cir. 1991), and Murray v. City of Austin, 947 F.2d 147
(5th Cir. 1991)).
95. 68 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 1995).
96. See Robinson, 68 F.3d at 1230 (noting that Tenth Circuit had already dealt
with same question in Friedman); see also Stow, 29 F. Supp. 2d 845 (making no men-
tion of Robinson decision in its review of cases on Establishment Clause challenges
to government seals).
97. See Stow, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 849-50 (discussing Friedman and Zion decisions).
98. See id.
99. See id. at 849 (noting widespread, year-round usage of seals struck down in
Firiedman and Zion).
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violate the Establishment Clause, with the Friedman and Zion decisions. 1 0 °
Still, the Murray decision was not described in terms to suggest that it
could not be reconciled with the Friedman and Zion rulings. 10 ' In fact, the
district court described the Murray holding in language that conformed
with the general endorsement test framework, explaining how the Murray
court focused on the context of the disputed insignia to find that a reason-
able observer would not have perceived any endorsement of religion from
it.' 02
From the three circuit court opinions that the Stow court reviewed,
two rejecting seals with crosses and one upholding such a seal, the court
distilled its "guiding principle"' 03-that although governmental bodies
may carefully make use of religious concepts or symbols, they may not
make use of a sectarian concept or symbol on a daily basis.10 4 The court
stated that "general references to a higher, spiritual authority must be per-
missible to give full effect to the Free Exercise Clause," but held that this
logic cannot save government practices that are clearly tied to one particu-
lar faith or sect. 10 5 The court made it plain that government practices
would invariably run afoul of the Establishment Clause when the appear-
ance of such sectarian symbolism was pervasive and ongoing, as it was with
the usage of Stow's seal. 10 6
2. District Court's Application of the Lemon Test
Applying the Lemon test, the district court first found that there was
no evidence of the city having harbored any improper purpose, for en-
100. See id. at 850.
101. See id. (discussing basis of Murray court's decision).
102. See id. (noting Murray court's emphasis on context). Regarding the im-
pact of Austin's insignia upon reasonable observers, the Stow Court stated that "in
its context, [the cross] does not endorse religion in any true or meaningful sense
of the word .... Id. (quoting Murray v. City of Austin, 947 F.2d 147, 158 (5th Cir.
1991)).
103. See id. (stating that one guiding principle runs through circuit court rul-
ings on Establishment Clause challenges to government seals).
104. See id. (setting forth guiding principle distilled from case law). Black's
Law Dictionary defines sectarian as "[d]enominational; devoted to, peculiar to, [or]
pertaining to . . . the interest of a sect, or sects." BLACK'S LAw DicTIONARY 1353
(6th ed. 1990). Sect, in turn, is defined as "a party or body of persons who unite in
holding certain special doctrines or opinions concerning religion .... " Id.
105. See Stow, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 850 (noting that careful use of nonsectarian
religious or spiritual symbolism is not prohibited under this principle, and that this
approach will not conflict with Free Exercise Clause). The Free Exercise Clause is
the portion of the First Amendment that, in conjunction with the Establishment
Clause's prohibition against laws involving the establishment of religion, further
prohibits laws "restraining the free exercise" of religion. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
106. See Stow, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 850 (stating that violation of Establishment
Clause will generally be found for daily governmental use of symbolism that clearly
refers to beliefs or practices of one particular religion). For a discussion on the
pervasive usage of Stow's seal, see supra note 78 and accompanying text.
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dorsing Christianity or otherwise, in using the seal. 10 7 It was determined
that inclusion of the cross was intended merely to display an important
aspect of the community, with the secular purpose of representing Stow's
people and government. 10 8 The seal faced a more serious challenge
under Lemon's second prong.1 09 The district court used the endorsement
formulation in its application of Lemon's second prong effects test. 10 The
question of whether the Stow City seal had the impermissible effect of
endorsing religion was assessed from the point of view of a "reasonable
observer."I' The City's attempts to defend its seal by referencing to prac-
tices like the Thanksgiving holiday, which have passed constitutional mus-
ter despite obvious religious content, were rejected because those
practices did not endorse any particular religion. 112 In contrast, the cross
in Stow's seal was found to have the effect of endorsing one specific faith,
that of Christianity.1 13 Claims that the cross was not necessarily a Chris-
tian cross were rejected as inconsistent with what would be perceived by
any reasonable observer. 1 14
The significance of the cross in Stow's seal, as a symbol of Christianity
in particular, was held to be unmistakable.' 15 In that respect, the Stow
seal was held to be indistinguishable from those in the Friedman and Zion
cases. 116 The court noted, however, that the Austin City insignia, upheld
107. See id. at 851 (finding no evidence to suggest that the seal should fail
under Lemon's secular purpose prong).
108. See id. (discussing the City of Stow's legitimate purpose in adopting its
official seal).
109. See id. (noting that Stow's "real challenge" in defending their seal comes
under Lemon's second prong effects test).
110. See id. (analyzing Stow's seal under endorsement formulation of Lemon's
second prong). The court applied the endorsement test "as stated by Justice
O'Connor in Lynch v. Donnelly, 'whether irrespective of [the] government's actual
purpose, the practice under review in fact conveys a message of endorsement or
disapproval."' Id. (quoting Lynch v Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O'Connor,
J., concurring )).
111. See id. (citing County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492
U.S. 573, 620 (1989)). The Allegheny opinion stated that in determining whether
the disputed holiday displays conveyed a message of endorsement, the perspectives
of Christians and Jews, as well as people of other faiths, ought to be considered.
See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 620
(1989) (discussing application of reasonable observer standard to religious en-
dorsement questions).
112. See Stow, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 851 (distinguishing Stow's seal from generally
accepted government practices that neither endorse nor advance any particular
religion, and therefore do not violate Establishment Clause).
113. See id. (noting that cross in seal conveyed message of endorsement for
Christianity by excluding other belief systems).
114. See id. (noting that religious nature of cross is beyond dispute (citing
Friedman v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Bernalillo, 781 F.2d 777, 782 (10th Cir. 1985)
(en banc))).
115. See id. at 851-52 (noting that cross, as symbol, is indisputably representa-
tive of Christianity).
116. See id. at 852 (finding no meaningful difference).
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in Murray, could be distinguished from the Stow seal. 17 The Stow seal was
found to convey an unmitigated message of endorsement for a particular
religion, unlike the Austin insignia, which was found to be permissible
because its unique historic derivation negated the impact on observers
that would otherwise accompany the presence of a cross in a government
seal.11
8
The City's attempt to draw support from ACLU v. Capitol Square Review
& Advisory Board,1 9 a then-recent ruling by the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Ohio, upholding the Ohio State motto
of "With God All Things Are Possible," was also rejected. 120 Contrary to
the City's contention, the Southern District's ruling had been based on
the finding that the motto, unlike the Stow seal, would more likely be
understood as an acknowledgment of religion generally, rather than as an
endorsement of one particular faith.' 2 1 Given that each of the City's ef-
forts to defend its seal failed to overcome the endorsement formulation of
Lemon's second prong, it was unnecessary for the court to continue its
analysis under the third prong, the excessive entanglement test.122 The
seal, as designed, could not pass muster under the second prong of the
Lemon Test, and thus the court held that the seal violated the Establish-
ment Clause.' 23 The court took pains, however, to make clear that its rul-
ing did not completely preclude localities from acknowledging the
117. See id. (noting that Austin insignia could be differentiated from Stow seal
based on its historical derivation, if not on its appearance, because derivation of
insignia was well known in Austin and would presumably impact perceptions of
reasonably informed observers).
118. See id. (noting that in context, Stow's seal would much more likely result
in perception of "second-class citizen[ship]" for adherents of non-majority beliefs
than would Austin's insignia). For a discussion on how the unique derivation of
Austin's insignia affects its treatment under the endorsement test, see infra notes
141-52 and accompanying text.
119. 20 F. Supp. 2d 1176 (S.D. Ohio 1998), affd en banc, 2001 U.S. App.
LEXIS 3964 (6th Cir. Mar. 16, 2001).
120. See Stow, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 852 (rejecting City's attempt to rely on ACLU
v. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. ruling). The challenged Ohio motto, "With
God All Things Are Possible," was taken from a passage in the New Testament of
the Christian Bible. See ACLU v. Capitol Square Rev. & Advisoy Bd., 210 F.3d 703,
703 (6th Cir. 2000) (noting origins of disputed motto).
121. See Stow, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 853 (noting that district court in Capitol Square
Review & Advisory Board followed line of cases distinguishing between government
actions acknowledging religion generally, and practices conveying endorsement of
particular religious beliefs). It is worth noting that the District Court for the
Southern District of Ohio's decision in Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board has
since been upheld by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
sitting en banc. See ACLU v. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board, 2001 U.S.
App. LEXIS 3964 (6th Cir. Mar 16, 2001) (affirming district court's ruling).
122. See Stow, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 851 (finding that seal unconstitutionally en-
dorsed Christianity, without deciding whether seal fostered excessive entangle-
ment between government and religion).
123. See id. at 853 (granting ACLU's motion for summary judgment on
ground that seal was unconstitutional as matter of law).
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importance of religion to their citizens. 124 As for non-sectarian options,
which might properly be used by governments to symbolize the impor-
tance of religion in their communities, the court suggested using "hands
clasped in prayer, or even a reference to God."
125
B. Critical Analysis
1. District Court's Application of the Lemon Test
The district court's statement that "[w]hile the Supreme Court has
been unwilling to endorse the Lemon test as the 'be-all' and 'end-all' in
Establishment Clause cases, it has continued to apply it almost exclusively,"
glosses over the serious dissatisfaction surrounding that test.126 Nonethe-
less, application of Lemon in the context of Establishment Clause chal-
lenges to government seals is well supported by case law. 127 The court's
focus, in its application of Lemon, on whether the seal would convey a mes-
sage of endorsement to a reasonably informed observer, is also well sup-
ported in this context.1 28 Furthermore, the court's attention to the
pervasive and year-round use of the Stow City seal is also a common ele-
ment in opinions dealing with religious symbolism in government seals.129
124. See id. (noting that there are many nonsectarian ways for cities to recog-
nize importance of religion to local community).
125. See id. at 852 (discussing ways that religion might be acknowledged with-
out running afoul of Establishment Clause).
126. For a discussion on criticisms of the Lemon test and inconsistencies in its
application, see supra notes 33-44 and accompanying text.
127. For a discussion of cases applying the Lemon test in the context of Estab-
lishment Clause challenges to religious symbols in government seals, see supra
note 47 and accompanying text.
128. See Robinson v. City of Edmond, 68 F.3d 1226, 1229 (10th Cir. 1995)
(noting that primary issue in case was whether challenged seal violated Lemon test's
second prong, which, expressed "in endorsement test terms," asks whether any
message of favoritism for a particular religion was being conveyed); Murray v. City
of Austin, 947 F.2d 147, 156 (5th Cir. 1991) ("giving special consideration to the
endorsement test" in analysis of dispute over city insignia); Harris v. City of Zion,
927 F.2d 1401, 1415 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that seals for cities of Rolling Mead-
ows and Zion unconstitutionally endorsed particular religious faith); Friedman v.
Bd. of County Comm'rs of Bernalillo, 781 F.2d 777, 782 (10th Cir. 1985) (en banc)
(noting that government cannot cause members of minority faiths to feel like out-
siders through endorsement of majority's religion); Webb v. City of Republic, 55 F.
Supp. 2d 994, 1000 (W.D. Mo. 1999) (noting that inclusion of Christian fish sym-
bol in city seal had impermissible effect of endorsing that religion); see also
Foremaster v. City of St. George, 882 F.2d 1485, 1492 (10th Cir. 1989) (remanding
case for further proceedings to decide whether challenged seal conveyed message
of endorsement).
129. See Robinson, 68 F.3d at 1232 (noting pervasive use of seal); Murray, 947
F.2d at 167 (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (stating that evidence suggested pervasive
use of Austin insignia); Harris, 927 F.2d at 1408-09 (noting that Rolling Meadows
and Zion seals were displayed widely throughout year); Friedman, 781 F.2d at 782
(contrasting pervasive appearance of government seal with short term use of holi-
day creche displays); Webb, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1000-01 (noting continuous invasion
of non-Christian residents' lives by appearance of Christian symbol in City of Re-
public's seal).
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By giving special attention to the pervasive nature of the use of govern-
ment seals, courts have set this particular issue apart as a discrete Establish-
ment Clause question, distinguishable from the complicated case law of
holiday display cases.130
2. The Guiding Principle
The Stow court never acknowledged the potential circuit split on this
issue identified by justice Rehnquist's dissent to the denial of certiorari for
the Robinson decision. 13 1 Rather than directly denying the existence of a
circuit split, the court simply distilled a single decisional guideline that
harmonizes the rulings of the circuit courts.' 3 2 The centerpiece of the
Stow court's analysis must be this "guiding principle," derived from the
cases the court reviewed. 133 This principle, that a governmental body can-
not use a "sectarian concept or symbol on a daily basis," effectively harmo-
nizes the existing circuit court decisions on religious symbols in
government seals, while providing clear and practical guidance for this
specific area of Establishment Clause inquiry.' 4 The Stow decision's guid-
ing principle for the discrete issue of government seal challenges compli-
ments Lemon's test for general Establishment Clause questions, allowing
the court to arrive at one consistent and plausible result.' 35
130. See MENENDEZ, supra note 9, at 151 (noting lack of useful guidance for
local officials from ambiguous rulings in holiday display cases). The Supreme
Court's rulings on holiday displays have been quite sensitive to physical context,
alternatively upholding and striking down uses of religious symbols depending on
their immediate surroundings. See, e.g., CHEMERINSKV, supra note 19, at 1002 (not-
ing that United States Supreme Court's plurality opinion in County of Allegheny v.
ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573 (1989), found one display containing
creche unconstitutional, but upheld another display containing menorah). For
Justices O'Connor and Blackmun, whose votes in Allegheny resulted in one display
being invalidated and the other upheld, the critical difference between the two was
the presence or absence within the displays of other, secular, symbolic elements.
See id. (noting that context was deciding factor for critical swing votes in Allegheny).
Decisions on government seals, in contrast, have repeatedly struck down seals that
contained non-religious elements along with the challenged religious elements.
See, e.g., Robinson, 68 F.3d at 1228 (invalidating seal that contained covered wagon
and other symbols, in addition to cross); Harris, 927 F.2d at 1403 (striking down
seals with non-religious elements, including water tower and dove).
131. See generally Stow, 29 F. Supp. 2d 845 (N.D. Ohio 1998) (making no refer-
ence to possible circuit split on religious symbols in government seals). For a dis-
cussion on Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent to the United States Supreme Court's
denial of certiorari for the Robinson decision, see notes 70-72 and accompanying
text.
132. See Stow, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 850 (discussing "guiding principle running
through" decisions of Seventh, Tenth and Fifth Circuits).
133. See id. (attempting to harmonize rulings in Murray, Harris and Friedman).
134. For a discussion on the Stow court's decision as a practical guide for cities
and courts confronted with similar questions, see infra note 161 and accompanying
text.
135. See Stow, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 849-50 (deriving principle from circuit court
decisions that applied Lemon test, to guide analysis of government seal disputes).
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3. Harmonizing the Murray Ruling
The Fifth Circuit's Murray decision poses the most obvious challenge
for any standard of decision that would harmonize the case law on this
issue.1 36 This is a crucial point because, by harmonizing the decisions of
the circuit courts, the Stow opinion brings further stability into an area of
law that is already fairly settled.137 The difficulty, however, lies in recon-
ciling this one decision, holding that a cross in a government seal is per-
missible, with the weight of authority holding similar seals
unconstitutional. 13 8 The Stow court, however, resolved this apparent con-
flict by pointing out that the Murray court's analysis was entirely consistent
with the endorsement test framework that has been employed consistently
throughout the case law on this issue. 139 Simply put, the Stow court recog-
nizes Murray as a decision focusing on the impact that a particular cross
would have on reasonable, informed observers, rather than a decision tak-
ing a novel stance on the effect of crosses generally.1 40
The Stow court distinguished the Austin City insignia from the Stow
seal on the basis that a reasonable non-Christian resident of Austin would
not be made to feel like a "second-class citizen," because of the unique
derivation of the Austin seal.14 1 Implicitly, the Stow court is saying that
136. See City of Edmond v. Robinson, 517 U.S. 1201, 1201 (1996) (Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting) (noting contrast between Seventh Circuit's Harris decision, strik-
ing down seal with cross, and Fifth Circuit's ruling in Murray, upholding insignia
with cross). But see Murray v. City of Austin, 947 F.2d 147, 156 (5th Cir. 1991)
(expressly recognizing that other circuits had struck down government seals with
religious symbolism, but attributing difference to varying facts rather than recog-
nizing any circuit split).
137. For a discussion of the trend toward stability in this area of law, see infra
notes 173-78 and accompanying text.
138. For a discussion of the cases striking down city seals with religious im-
agery that were reviewed by the Stow court, see supra notes 97-99 and accompany-
ing text.
139. See Murray, 947 F.2d at 158 (finding no message of endorsement in Aus-
tin insignia, when taken in context). By recognizing that the Murray decision
rested on the finding that Austin's insignia did not convey any message of endorse-
ment, the Stow court brought that ruling into harmony with the decisions of the
other circuits on this issue. See Stow, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 852 (noting that historic
derivation of cross within Austin insignia was well-known and, therefore, relevant
to impression that reasonably informed observer would take from it).
140. See Stow, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 852 (noting that awareness of Austin's insig-
nia's historic derivation would greatly reduce chances that an impermissible mes-
sage would be conveyed to non-Christian residents); see also Murray, 947 F.2d at 158
(deciding case on "totality of its unique facts and circumstances" without establish-
ing "a bright line test to apply in future challenges"); cf Knapp v. Leonardo, 46
F.3d 170, 182 (2d Cir. 1995) (Oakes J., dissenting) (distinguishing motto "Annuit
Coeptis," meaning "He (God) has favored our undertakings," found in some
courtrooms on reverse side of "the Great Seal of the United States," from items
with genuine religious content, based on "immediacy of impact" on observers).
141. See Stow, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 852 (distinguishing between city seals of Stow
and Austin). In distinguishing the Austin insignia from the Stow seal, the court
also implicitly distinguishes it from those rejected in the Harris and Friedman cases,
having stated that no "meaningful distinction" exists between them and the Stow
604 [Vol. 46: p. 585
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because of the Austin City insignia's derivation, the cross appearing in it
ceases to be, for any reasonable observer, the sort of sectarian symbol that
the cross in Stow's City seal was found to be.142
The crucial method for differentiating the Austin seal from those that
were struck down in other cases is to focus on the symbolic message con-
veyed, rather than considering only physical or visual content.1 43 It is on
this critical distinction that the Edmonds decision can be misleading, imply.
ing that Murray cannot be reconciled with Friedman and Harris, by declin-
ing "to hold that some visible . . .religious images are permissible while
other identically visible religious images are not."144 Relative visibility of
items in a seal need not even be a factor in an Establishment Clause in-
quiry if the challenged item does not convey some message of
endorsement. 1
45
The common element shared by the seals struck down in Friedman
and Stow is that they both contained a cross that was intended to, and did
in fact, carry an independent symbolic message. 14 6 A reasonable observer
seal. See id. (finding Stow seal indistinguishable from seals struck down in other
circuits).
142. See id. (focusing on historical derivation of Austin's insignia to show why
it could be upheld while Stow's seal must be struck down); cf. W. Va. State Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 662 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("The sig-
nificance of a symbol lies in what it represents.").
143. See Murray, 947 F.2d at 156 (noting that, under endorsement formula-
tion of effects test, message conveyed by use of religious symbolism is determina-
tive factor).
144. See Robinson v. City of Edmond, 68 F.3d 1226, 1233 (10th Cir. 1995)
(refusing to differentiate between crosses of equivalent visibility based on context
within seal). In its concern over courts becoming "immersed in the minutiae of
graphic design .... rulers and calipers in hand, scrutinizing each symbol for ac-
ceptable proportion, color and gloss," the Robinson opinion loses sight of the fact
that the context of a symbol can influence perceptions of observers. See id. (quot-
ing Murray, 947 F.2d at 170 (Goldberg, J., dissenting)). The Stow court properly
recognizes the fact that consideration of the effect of an image similar to the cross
in Austin's seal properly includes whatever contextual matters a reasonable ob-
server would take into account in ascertaining its meaning. See Stow, 29 F. Supp. 2d
at 852 (noting that observers in Austin would know that insignia was derived from
family crest, and such knowledge would impact on their perception of what mes-
sage it conveyed).
145. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring) ("The effect prong asks whether, irrespective of government's actual pur-
pose, the practice under review in fact conveys a message of endorsement or
disapproval.").
146. See, e.g., Stow, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 847 (discussing Stow's claims regarding
intended meaning of symbols in its seal). The City did not dispute that the sym-
bols in its seal were intended to convey meaning, but sought, unsuccessfully, to
label the message of the seal's challenged quadrant as an acknowledgment of "Ulti-
mate Concern [s]" of the community generally. See id. at 851 (finding that reasona-
ble observer would perceive message of "official connection between the city and
Christianity" from seal); see also Friedman v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Bernalillo,
781 F.2d 777, 779 (10th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (noting testimony of one county
commissioner, indicating that Bernalillo's cross represented role of Catholic
Church in settlement of Southwest).
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would understand those crosses, as they appeared within their respective
seals, as independent elements conveying particular messages on behalf of
their respective cities. 147 Once it has been established that those crosses
conveyed a symbolic message, the historical association between crosses
and Christianity makes that message sectarian in nature. 148
The cross appearing in the City of Austin's insignia was not a sectarian
symbol because it did not carry any independent symbolic message on be-
half of the city.149 As one element in the family crest of Stephen F. Austin,
the cross originally conveyed a symbolic message, and it was so in-
tended.150 Nonetheless, when that family crest was incorporated into Aus-
tin's insignia, its components lost their independent significance and the
crest as a whole came to represent only the historical personage of Ste-
phen F. Austin. 15 ' A reasonable observer, aware of the basic and perhaps
self-evident fact that Austin's city insignia embodies the family crest of a
historic figure, would not then interpret the internal elements of that crest
as conveying any message of endorsement or otherwise on the city's
behalf.15
2
Support for the idea that the historical context of a government prac-
tice is a relevant factor for deciding Establishment Clause questions can be
found in the Supreme Court's Marsh ruling.153 Though Marsh, unlike
147. See, e.g., Friedman, 781 F.2d at 782 (emphasizing fact that cross in Berna-
lillo's seal was only visual element set off by rays of light); Stow, 29 F. Supp. 2d at
851 (finding that images in seal were intended to symbolize significant aspects of
life in Stow).
148. See Stow, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 852 (noting that "cross is 'the principal symbol
of Christianity around the world..."' (quoting Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd.
v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 792 (1995))); cf. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 632 (1943) (noting that religious symbols, such as crosses, convey spiri-
tual messages on church's behalf, just as state symbolism carries political meaning
on government's behalf); M. Colleen Connor, The Constitutionality of Religious Sym-
bols on Government Property: A Suggested Approach, 37 J. CHURCH & ST. 385, 385(1995) (noting that symbols will often become closely tied to particular religious
beliefs because of role such symbols play in practices of specific religious groups).
149. See Murray v. City of Austin, 947 F.2d 147, 155 (5th Cir. 1991) (noting
that effect of Austin's insignia, when viewed in its entirety, was to commemorate
distinctive local history and to distinguish government activities).
150. See id. at 149 (noting that cross was added to family crest to signify fact
that one of Stephen F. Austin's ancestors took part in crusades).
151. See id. at 150 (noting that cross was included in insignia as part of family
crest of Stephen F. Austin, for whom city was named); see also TRIBE, supra note 8,
at 1294 (discussing capacity of context to neutralize religious messages, as impor-
tant exception to rules prohibiting government use of "religious tools").
152. See Stow, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 852 (noting that general knowledge in Austin,
of insignia's derivation, affects message conveyed).
153. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786-92 (1983) (reviewing historical
background of government sponsored prayer at legislative sessions, in analysis of
Establishment Clause challenge to that practice). The Marsh opinion provides
some guidance as to how much weight ought to be accorded to the historical con-
text of a government practice for Establishment Clause questions. See id. at 790
(noting that although long-standing and continuous practice cannot establish
right to violate Constitution, such continuity should also not be ignored in decid-
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Murray, was decided without relying on Lemon, the logic of the two deci-
sions runs parallel. 154 The Marsh ruling was based in part on historical
evidence that the delegates to the Continental Congress did not consider
the practice of government sponsored prayers in the legislature "as sym-
bolically placing the government's 'official seal of approval on one relig-
ious view.'"155 This "seal of approval" language can be fairly read as
stating that the founders did not view legislative prayers as "endorsing" any
particular religion. 156 As such, the Supreme Court has held that a govern-
ment practice does not threaten disestablishment principles because its
historical background suggested that the founders did not perceive it as
carrying any message of endorsement. 157 In that context, it seems quite
consistent that the Fifth Circuit in Murray would look to the commonly
known historical background of a government practice to determine
whether reasonable persons would perceive an impermissible message of
endorsement from it.158
By recognizing the consistency running through the Murray decision
and the other circuit court rulings on this issue, the Stow decision was able
to put forward a comprehensive guiding principle for dealing with this
type of dispute.15 9 Furthermore, the identification of a consensus among
the courts of appeals on this issue will tend to discourage further litigation
of similar disputes, with the concomitant effect that the law on this issue is
likely to become frozen in place. 160 As for the practical value of the ruling
for cities seeking guidance on how to deal with similar disputes, it remains
ing constitutionality); see also County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh
Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 630 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in judgment) (noting that background of government practice is pertinent to
Establishment Clause inquiry because reasonable observer takes background into
account in determining whether message of endorsement is conveyed).
154. For a discussion of the facts and holding of the Marsh case, see supra
notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
155. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792 (quoting Chambers v. Marsh, 675 F.2d 228, 234
(8th Cir. 1982)).
156. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 120 S. Ct. 2266, 2278 (2000) (using
"seal of approval" phrase in discussion of whether challenged school practice con-
veyed message of endorsement).
157. See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 791 (finding support for upholding contested leg-
islative prayer in historical evidence suggesting that First Amendment draftsmen
did not see any threat to Establishment Clause from similar government activities).
158. See Murray v. City of Austin, 947 F.2d 147, 155 (5th Cir. 1991) (noting
similarity of challenged use of insignia to practice disputed Marsh; in its long his-
tory, lack of evidence suggesting intent to promote any particular faith and ab-
sence of risk of establishment of religion); cf. TRIBE, supra note 8, at 1294-95
(noting that within historical context, practices can lose their religious
significance).
159. See Stow, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 850 (noting that one guiding principle-
prohibiting daily government usage of sectarian symbols-runs through rulings of
circuit courts).
160. For a discussion on how the weight of authority prohibiting blatantly
sectarian seals acts to deter further litigation on the issue, see infra notes 173-78
and accompanying text.
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to be seen whether local governments will be amenable to using the non-
denominational symbolism that the court suggests.
16 1
V. AFTERMATH OF THE STOW RULING AND IMPORTANCE FOR
FUTURE DISPUTES
A. Epilogue
Following the district court's disposition of the Stow case, the City
came to an agreement with the ACLU to resolve their dispute. 16 2 A new
seal with the words "In God We Trust" replacing the cross was adopted,
and the crosses on older seals were covered up with tape pending their
removal. 163 Stow's City Council had originally voted to spend the esti-
mated one hundred thousand dollars it could have taken to challenge the
district court's ruling, but they finally chose to accept the ruling and re-
move the cross. 164 The City ended up spending about six thousand dol-
lars-three thousand dollars to the insurance carrier that had paid for the
legal defense of the seal and about three thousand dollars to purchase the
new seals to comply with the court's decision. 16 5 The fact that the insurer
161. See Stow, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 852 (noting that reference to God or image of
"hands clasped in prayer" might be acceptable ways for government to acknowl-
edge religion). Some evidence can be found to indicate that the Stow court's sug-
gestion of nonsectarian references to God might not be an entirely satisfactory
solution for politicians trying to appease local voters. See Rofes, supra note 6, at 880
(noting that after one Wisconsin city replaced cross in its seal with "In God We
Trust" motto to avoid potential lawsuit, its formerly popular mayor was nearly
voted out of office in favor of opponent whose two main campaign promises were
to provide free doughnuts at his office on Thursdays and to bring back old logo).
162. See Karen Farkas, Stow Nears End of City Seal Battle, PLAiN DEALER (Cleve-
land), Apr. 16, 1999, at IB, available at 1999 WL 2358458 (noting resolution of
dispute underlying Stow case).
163. See id. (discussing steps taken by City of Stow to comply with district
court's ruling). The open book that had appeared in the same quadrant of the
Stow seal as the cross, was retained. See Donna J. Robb, Stow Council Picks New
Design for Seal, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Feb. 13, 1999, at lB (noting that "un-
marked open book on the seal, commonly seen as a Bible" will be kept in new
seal).
164. See Farkas, supra note 162, at lB (discussing Stow City Council's decision
not to pursue appeal). The Mayor of Stow explained that the resolution of the case
was a compromise because Stow would be able to keep some measure of spiritual
symbolism in its seal. See id. (discussing Mayor's reaction to resolution of seal dis-
pute). But see Robb, supra note 163, at lB (noting that coalition of local citizens
felt that ruling had taken away their free speech rights, and that settlement was
contrary to will of Stow's citizens).
165. See generally Farkas, supra note 162 (noting costs to City for legal defense,
and replacement of seals). Donations covered much of the eight thousand dollar
deductible on Stow's insurance policy, leaving the three thousand dollar remain-
der to be paid from City funds. See id. (discussing sources of funds for legal
expenses).
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would not have paid for an appeal of the district court's ruling was appar-
ently a factor in the city's decision not to pursue further litigation. 16 6
B. Impact
The Stow decision is the ruling of a federal district court and, there-
fore, carries only persuasive weight as legal precedent for other dis-
triCts. 16 7 The true importance of this decision lies in the fact that it
persuasively synthesizes and harmonizes the existing case law on chal-
lenges to religious symbols in government seals:' 68 The Supreme Court's
Establishment Clause jurisprudence from the last century has left an ex-
ceptionally complicated body of precedent for lower courts to apply.16 9
Without a Supreme Court opinion speaking directly to this issue, localities
and lower courts dealing with challenges to city seals will seek out gui-
dance elsewhere.17 0 The Stow decision serves this need by finding the
common ground among the circuit court decisions on this issue, and dis-
tilling them into one guiding principle for dealing with religious symbol-
ism in government seals.
171
Cities facing a costly and divisive battle in the courts can look to the
Stow court's synthesis of the case law on this issue to predict whether their
seals will survive a challenge, or whether any compromise choices might
be acceptable to all parties. 172 Also, as the weight of authority prohibiting
blatantly sectarian symbols in municipal seals continues to grow, localities
will be increasingly reluctant to engage in dubious litigation over seals that
seem unlikely to withstand judicial scrutiny. 173 The Stow ruling strength-
166. See id. (noting that lack of insurance coverage for legal fees discouraged
further litigation).
167. See RJcHAR B. CAPPALLI, THE AMERICAN COMMON LAW METHOD 20
(1997) (noting that law of federal district court begins and ends at boundaries of
that district); KARL LLEWELLYN, THE CASE LAW SYSTEM IN AMERICA 28-29 (Paul
Gewirtz ed., Michael Ansaldi trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 1989) (noting that prece-
dents of federal district courts are not binding on one another).
168. For a discussion of the Stow opinion's synthesis of the Establishment
Clause case law on religious symbols in government seals, see supra notes 131-61
and accompanying text.
169. See WIrrE, supra note 1, at 149 (noting Supreme Court's difficulty inte-
grating various principles brought into Establishment Clause analysis by individual
justices).
170. See David L. Gregory & CharlesJ. Russo, The Supreme Court's Jurisprudence
of Religious Symbol and Substance, 28 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 419, 424 (1997) (concluding
that Supreme Court's decisions regarding religious symbols do not provide much
useful guidance to government decisionmakers).
171. See Stow, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 852 (noting that although Establishment
Clause prohibits use of sectarian symbolism in seal, cities may acknowledge relig-
ion in general if done with care).
172. See id. at 853 (noting that many nonsectarian options remain that would
allow Stow to acknowledge importance of religion to its citizens).
173. Cf MENENDEZ, supra note 9, at 144-45 (discussing actions taken by local
governments to avoid costly litigation over holiday displays).
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ens this trend by downplaying any possible split among the circuits. 174 If
cities faced with similar Establishment Clause challenges choose simply to
avoid litigation by removing disputed symbols from their seals, the law on
this issue will remain as it currently stands. 175
The City of Stow's decision not to appeal in this case foreshadows the
possible reluctance of other municipalities to engage in litigation over sim-
ilar questions, suggesting that the law in this area will indeed become fixed
in its present state. 176 Despite public pressures, other cities have already
chosen to accept compromises rather than litigate or appeal similar issues
in the courts. 17 7 The City Attorney for one such municipality said publicly
that "his ethical obligations as a lawyer," and the threat of being sanc-
tioned for filing frivolous pleadings, would preclude him from defending
their seal given the current state of First Amendment law. 178
To avoid litigation and pacify voters, cities may follow the Stow court's
opinion by using clearly non-sectarian images to acknowledge religion, or
they might follow the City's example by falling back on symbolic items like
the "In God We Trust" motto, with its constitutionality already firmly estab-
lished. 179 When localities choose to defend similar seals in the courts,
however, the Stow decision will stand convincingly for the proposition that
the courts have reached a consensus against daily governmental usage of
sectarian images.' 8 0
174. See Stow, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 849-50 (noting that one principle runs
through rulings of Tenth, Seventh and Fifth Circuits on this issue).
175. SeeWITrE, supra note 1, at 173 (noting that local governments often com-
promise voluntarily on Establishment Clause disputes in order to avoid expensive
lawsuits).
176. See id. at 174 (discussing "voluntary 'First Amendmentization' of religion
and politics," by local governments).
177. See Rofes, supra note 6, at 877-78 (noting Wauwatosa City Government's
decision to remove cross from seal rather than face potential litigation); see also
John Rogers, After Court Fight, City Removes Christian Symbol from Its Seal, PATRIOT
LEDGER (Quincy, Mass.),July 21, 1999, at 12, available at 1999 WL 8467855 (discuss-
ing Republic, Missouri's decision to remove Christian fish symbol from its seal,
rather than appeal court ruling). But see Karst, supra note 5, at 509 (arguing that
local politicians are likely to knowingly intensify divisions over religious symbols in
government for political gain).
178. See Rofes, supra note 6, at 877 (noting Wauwatosa City Attorney's reasons
for counseling against litigating city seal dispute); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)
(providing that attorney filing pleadings certifies that "legal contentions therein
are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument").
179. See Farkas, supra note 162, at 1B (noting that City of Stow replaced cross
in seal with "In God We Trust" motto); cf. Gaylor v. United States, 74 F.3d 214, 217-
18 (10th Cir. 1996) (rejecting challenge to statutes establishing "In God We trust"
as national motto). The Gaylor court pointed to repeated and uncontradicted sup-
port, in United States Supreme Court dicta, for the constitutionality of the na-
tional motto. See id. at 217 (noting support for upholding national motto).
180. Cf Webb v. City of Republic, 55 F. Supp. 2d 994, 1000 (W.D. Mo. 1999)
(noting that absent special factors similar to those present in Murray, legal prece-
dent is settled on prohibition of religious symbols in city seals).
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C. Conclusion
The district court's opinion laments the fact that this issue has caused
so much dissention in the Stow community, given the likelihood that few
residents ever noticed its contents prior to this dispute.18 1 Furthermore,
being forced by the courts to alter the symbols of their local civic pride has
surely caused genuine distress to defenders of the Stow seal and others like
it.' 8 2 On this point, however, we can look to the statement of the Tenth
Circuit in Friedman: "The comfort of the majority is not the main concern
of the Bill of Rights."' 8 3 In our modern, pluralistic society, the Stow deci-
sion stands clearly for the principle that the time has finally come to ban-
ish divisive sectarian imagery from government seals.1
8 4
Kevin J. McCabe
181. See Stow, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 852 (expressing regret that publicity surround-
ing legal battle over Stow's seal had increased its divisive impact).
182. See Farkas, supra note 162, at IB (noting that some Stow residents were
offended that cross in seal was covered in order to comply with district court rul-
ing); see also Rogers, supra note 177, at 12 (noting that residents reacted with
"[g] asps, hisses and shouts of '[s] pineless cowards"' to announcement that Repub-
lic, Missouri would remove Christian fish symbol from city seal, pursuant to district
court ruling); cf Thomas L. Jipping, From Least Dangerous Branch to Most Profound
Legacy: The High Stakes in Judicial Selection, 4 TEX. REv. L. & POL. 365, 401 & n.217
(2000) (mentioning Stow decision and also making reference to Webb decision,
which struck down seal with Christian fish symbol, while criticizing discourage-
ment of religion by Clinton-appointed judges).
183. Friedman v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Bernalillo, 781 F.2d 777, 782
(10th Cir. 1985) (en banc).
184. See Stow, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 852 ("If there is to be a use of a religious
symbol in a regular, daily context .... the governmental entity must take great
care that the symbol draws people together, and does not create a wedge among
them.").
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